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Abstract 
 
Harvey Brown’s Physical Relativity defends a view, the dynamical perspective, on 
the nature of spacetime that goes beyond the familiar dichotomy of 
substantivalist/relationist views.  A full defense of this view requires attention to 
the way that our use of  spacetime concepts connect with the physical world.  
Reflection on such matters, I argue, reveals that the dynamical perspective affords 
the only possible view about the ontological status of spacetime, in that putative 
rivals fail to express anything, either true or false. I conclude with remarks aimed 
at clarifying what is and isn’t in dispute with regards to the explanatory priority of 
spacetime and dynamics, at countering an objection raised by John Norton to views 
of this sort, and at clarifying the relation between background and effective 
spacetime structure. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Harvey Brown’s Physical Relativity is a delightful book, rich in historical details, whose 
main thrust is to an advance a view of the nature of spacetime structure, which he calls the 
dynamical perspective, that goes beyond the familiar dichotomy of substantivalism and 
relationism. The view holds that spacetime structure and dynamics are intrinsically conceptually 
intertwined and that talk of spacetime symmetries and asymmetries is nothing else than talk of the 
symmetries and asymmetries of dynamical laws. Brown has precursors in this; I count, for 
example, Howard Stein (1967) and Robert DiSalle (1995) among them. And he has successors; a 
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number of contemporary writers have adopted views along the same lines; among these are to be 
counted Eleanor Knox’s spacetime functionalism (Knox, this volume). 
The full import of the dynamical perspective has not been appreciated by all commentators 
on the book, and, indeed, there are passages that suggest that it was not fully appreciated by Brown 
himself, as we shall see. I claim that a full appreciation of the view has the capacity to transform 
the way that debates about the ontology of spacetime take place. 
I will argue that a full-blown defense of the view requires considerations of a sort that are 
very much out of fashion in the contemporary philosophical landscape. These involve 
considerations of the way that our concepts—in this case, spacetime concepts—gain purchase on 
the physical world. Though there can be no thought of a return to a discredited operationalism or 
verificationism, we nevertheless would do well to pay attention to the role that spacetime concepts 
play in the network of concepts we employ in our talk and thought about the physical world. 
Reflection on this, I claim, shows that a view along the lines advocated in Physical Relativity is 
the only possible one. Dynamical and spacetime concepts are inextricably intertwined to an extent 
that putative rivals fail to make sense; they do not succeed in expressing anything at all, either true 
or false. 
 
2. Shifts in spacetime theories 
To see this, it is useful to take as an example the radical shift in our spacetime notions 
associated with the shift from an Aristotelian, noninertial physics, to an inertial physics. 
An Aristotelian universe is finite, bounded within the celestial sphere. The center of the 
sphere is dynamically distinguished, in that it is the point towards which heavy objects, those 
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containing a preponderance of the element Earth, naturally tend, as these, unless forced to do 
otherwise, will tend to a state of rest as close to the centre as they can get. 
That the dynamical laws for terrestrial objects invoke a state of rest means that there must 
be a matter of fact about whether an object within the Aristotelian universe is in motion or not. 
Clearly, if an object is moving towards or away from the center, it is in motion. But the laws require 
there to be a matter of fact about whether an object that remains at a constant distance from the 
center is rotating about the center or not. That is, there is a standard of rotation about the center. 
This is not to be identified with rotation with respect to the stars fixed in the celestial sphere, as 
the distinguished state of nonrotation does not coincide with nonrotation with respect to the fixed 
stars; on the contrary, the sphere of fixed stars is in rotation with respect to the standard of 
nonrotation relevant to terrestrial dynamics. 
The spacetime structure appropriate to Aristotelian dynamics is much less symmetric than 
Galilean or Minkowski spacetime. Being spatially finite, it cannot be invariant under rigid spatial 
translations. Furthermore, since it has a dynamically privileged point, namely, the center of the 
cosmos, the spacetime structure is not invariant under transformations that move points around 
inside the sphere unless they keep that point fixed. However, the dynamics of terrestrial objects is 
symmetric with respect to rotations of the cosmos about its center.1 
                                                 
1 To avoid complications of interpretation, we confine our talk of dynamics, in the Aristotelian context, to the dynamics 
of terrestrial objects. According to Aristotle, it is in the nature of celestial objects to continually move in a circle. This 
accurately describes the behaviour of the celestial sphere, but why the motion of the wandering stars should be, not 
circular motion, but rather, compounded of circular motions, is a bit mysterious. There was a longstanding tradition 
among ancient astronomers (referred to as the compromise of Geminus) that physics, which deals with the causes of 
motion, is to be restricted to terrestrial phenomena, and that astronomers should confine their efforts to saving the 
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At every point in the Aristotelian cosmos other than the center, there is a dynamically 
distinguished direction: towards the center, and there is a distinguished standard of rotation about 
the center. We are justified in calling this spacetime structure because it is on the basis of this 
structure that we can express the notions of rest and motion required to formulation the dynamical 
laws. There is a difference between a certain point and certain directions being dynamically 
distinguished and merely being distinguished by relations with other objects. In an Aristotelian 
universe, every point can be distinguished from every other, in that every point within the universe 
has a unique distance from the center, and angular coordinates can be set up using either 
coordinates co-moving with the celestial sphere (the most useful one for celestial phenomena) or 
by projecting earthly latitude and longitude outward. But things do not behave differently, 
depending on their angular position. This is why we should regard the distinguished direction in 
which terrestrial objects fall as a matter of spacetime structure, and a direction distinguished, say, 
as the direction towards some particular star, as not. 
Of course, the center point is not only dynamically distinguished; it distinguished by the 
distribution of matter, as it is the location of the center of the earth. But this fact does not count as 
spacetime structure, because, according to Aristotelian dynamics, the natural home of terrestrial 
matter is not the center of the earth, wherever it may be, but the center of the cosmos; it is because 
terrestrial matter tends towards the center that the earth is located there, and not the other way 
around. It is the function of dynamical laws, not only to account for the actual motions of things, 
but to say how things would behave if they were arranged differently. Aristotle is clear on this 
                                                 
phenomena without explaining them. Our discussion of Aristotelian dynamics will respect this compromise. In the 
Aristotelian context, read “dynamical laws” as “dynamical laws pertaining to terrestrial objects.” 
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point; if the earth were displaced by force from the center, it would tend to fall back to it (De 
Caelo, 296b 10–20). 
Copernicus’s cosmos is, like Aristotle’s, finite in extent and spherical in shape. But the 
Copernican displacement of the earth from the center requires also a shift from Aristotelian 
dynamics, a shift barely adumbrated in Copernicus’ book and left by him for subsequent 
generations to complete, as, on the Copernican system, the earth is continually in motion in an 
orbit displaced from the center, with no tendency to fall towards the center and come to rest there. 
This means that the center of the cosmos is no longer dynamically distinguished, a fact that opened 
up the possibility of a space without a center, an infinite space, a possibility embraced by Thomas 
Digges, Copernicus’ first prominent defender in England. 
Copernicus, of course, had nothing to say about the causes of motion and did not provide 
a dynamics appropriate to his system, though, since his work turned the earth into an object in the 
same class as the wandering stars, the new system was at odds with the compromise of Geminus. 
Kepler attempted to extend physics to the celestial realm, as indication in the subtitle of his 
Astronomia Nova, but it was Newton who did so successfully, standing on the shoulders of Galileo 
and Huygens. 
On Newtonian gravity, gravitation of terrestrial objects is not towards any fixed point in 
space, nor, indeed, solely towards the center of the earth; every body gravitates towards every 
other body. If, further, all forces are forces of interaction between bodies, directed on the lines 
between them, then we have a dynamics that makes no distinction between points in space, and 
the appropriate spacetime structure involves a space symmetric under translations. 
Newton formulated his laws of motion as if there is an absolute distinction between rest 
and uniform motion. But his dynamical laws make no use of this distinction, as Newton was well 
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aware. This led, eventually, to the view that there is no absolute distinction between rest and 
motion, and to the formulation of Newtonian theory against a background of what we now call 
“Galilean spacetime,” which Stein has referred to as the “the true structure of the spacetime of 
Newtonian dynamics” (1967, 183). And even this, it has come to be realized, contains excess 
structure. Saunders (2013), reflecting on Newton’s Corollary VI of the Laws of motion, has argued 
that the spacetime appropriate to Newtonian dynamics is one with an absolute standard of rotation 
but without absolute acceleration; see Knox (2014), Weatherall (2016), Dewar (2016), and 
Wallace (forthcoming) for further discussion of this point, and its relation to the Newton-Cartan 
geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation. 
Electromagnetism, as originally formulated, appears to make ineliminable reference to the 
relative motion between ponderable matter and a background aether. It was Einstein’s insight that 
this is mere appearance, and that the theory can be reformulated in such a way that only the relative 
motion of pieces of ponderable matter plays a role; the aether, then, according to Einstein, becomes 
superfluous. The key move was to subject the concept of simultaneity to conceptual analysis and 
conclude that, in the context of electromagnetism at least, an absolute notion of distant simultaneity 
gains no purchase, because we have no notion of simultaneity independent of physical interactions 
that could, in principle, establish synchronization between systems that play the role of clocks. The 
conclusion is that the true spacetime structure of classical electromagnetism is one that possesses 
no notion of distant simultaneity, the structure that has come to be called Minkowski spacetime. 
 
3. Spacetime symmetries are dynamical symmetries, and vice versa 
The principles that, implicitly or explicitly, guide these shifts in conceptions of spacetime 
structure are explicitly formulated by Earman (1989, p. 46) as adequacy conditions on theories of 
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motion. The conditions require a match between dynamical symmetries and spacetime 
symmetries.2 
 
SP1 Any dynamical symmetry of T is a spacetime symmetry of T. 
 
SP2 Any space-time symmetry of T is a dynamical symmetry of T.  
 
Earman emphatically denies that these have the status of meaning postulates. SP1, for Earman, 
involves an invocation of Occam’s razor, whereas SP2 involves the idea that laws must be 
universal, and hold throughout space-time. 
What the discussion in the previous section is meant to suggest is that these principles do, 
in fact, hold in virtue of considerations of meaning. If we reflect on how we ascribe structure to 
spacetime, it is on the basis of dynamical considerations, and shifts in dynamics and shifts in 
spacetime structure go hand in hand. I suggest that principles linking dynamical structure and 
spacetime structure need not rest on dubious metaphysical principles, but are, rather, analytically 
true. Talk of spacetime symmetry is a codification of talk of dynamical symmetry. In this I am in 
substantial agreement with Pablo Acuña, who writes, 
 
                                                 
2 A comment on SP1. It excludes from consideration symmetries of the laws having to do with internal degrees of 
freedom, as we don’t typically count those as spacetime symmetries. That is, it presupposes that we have a distinction 
between internal degrees of freedom and spatiotemporal degrees of freedom, and that the dynamical laws under 
consideration are those that pertain to the spatiotemporal degrees of freedom. This presupposition will be maintained 
in my discussion. 
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Minkowski structure and Lorentz invariance need not be conceived in such a way 
that one must explain the other. Instead, they are better understood as the two sides 
of a single coin: the arrow between them is not explanatory, but analytic … (2016, 
p. 2). 
 
Let us consider SP1. If it is not analytically true, then it makes sense (even if we take it to 
be false) to talk about a spacetime asymmetry with no corresponding dynamical asymmetry. Any 
attempt to do so, I claim, fails. To speak, for example, of a state of rest with no dynamical 
significance is to abandon any sense the word has in physical discourse and not replace that sense 
with anything else. This is only non-obvious because we are using a familiar word. Suppose, 
instead, I asked you to consider a theory involving Galilean invariant dynamics, set in a spacetime 
that consists of Galilean spacetime with a distinguished set of parallel timelike lines, which are 
called splendid. You might reasonably ask: distinguished, in what sense? There are uncountably 
many sets of parallel lines that are just like the one called “splendid”; what difference is the label 
meant to pick out? The mere introduction of a word does not suffice to introduce a corresponding 
difference. We need not, and, indeed, cannot invoke Occam’s razor to eliminate structure unless 
we can say what structure is to be eliminated; Occam’s razor won’t be of any help unless we can 
tell the barber what to shave. We are no better off if, instead of “splendid,” we call the distinguished 
set a “state of rest,” if “rest” is stripped of any dynamical significance and none provided in its 
place.  
As for SP2: what justifies us in thinking that the preferred downward direction in an 
Aristotelian universe is a matter of spacetime structure, what distinguishes that sort of structure 
from other ways a direction may be indicated, e.g. by reference to asymmetries in the matter 
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distribution, is that in an Aristotelian universe, this direction is dynamically distinguished. For any 
asymmetry required to formulate the dynamics there is a corresponding spacetime asymmetry, 
simply because this is what it means to take an asymmetry to be a spacetime asymmetry rather 
than some other kind. 
Some readers will balk at this. Spacetime substantivalism, the view familiar to us from 
primers on the philosophy of spacetime, is perfectly intelligible, it will be said, whether one takes 
it to be true or false. I can picture, in my mind’s eye, a substantival space that is the stage on which 
the events of the world take place, which is in itself immoveable and hence defines a state of rest 
with respect to itself, though that state of rest is forever hidden from us because the mutual relations 
of sensible things are the same whether moving or at rest with respect to that state. This substantival 
space is, in my mind’s eye, a rather deep shade of greyish blue. 
To that it must be replied: pictures and metaphors are all well and good, provided that there 
is a non-metaphorical sense that can be attached to them. The stage of your metaphor is of wood 
or concrete or linoleum, and exerts a dynamical effect in the form of friction on things in contact 
with it and moving with respect to it. You ask me to imagine something just like that, but stripped 
of its friction, made invisible, indeed, stripped of all connections with dynamical properties—that 
is, stripped of everything that makes it a stage—but otherwise, just like a stage. 
It might be said that there is nothing easier than to imagine a space whose parts are spatial 
points that persist in time, the temporal stages of which bear the same relation of genidentity that 
the temporal stage of you that is reading these words bears to your remembered self of a few 
minutes ago. This analogy, also, breaks down; your temporal stages bear causal relations and 
relations of similarity to each other not shared with stages of other persons. In the complete absence 
of all of that, it would make no sense to regard your temporal stages as stages of the same person. 
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None of what warrants ascription of genidentity to your temporal stages holds for the points of a 
homogenous spacetime. 
 
I do not deny that one has a strong feeling—dare one say it, an intuition—that it does make 
sense to imagine a dynamically inert background space that defines true rest. But an intuition is a 
potentially dangerous thing for a philosopher to have. Iintellectual hygiene demands that we ask 
of our intuitions whether they can survive scrutiny and be transformed into considered judgments. 
In this case, I don’t think that the intuition survives such scrutiny. 
If we accept this, then there is no option beside the dynamical perspective.  In particular, a 
substantivalist attempt to speak of a self-subsisting spacetime with properties that are ontologically 
independent of dynamics fails to assert anything at all.  It is not false, but, rather, devoid of sense. 
 This denial that certain apparent disputes are genuine, on the grounds that the putative 
opponents fail to express contrary positions, is a descendent of a long lineage of such claims, made 
most notably in the twentieth century by logical empiricists on the grounds of a verificationist 
thesis about meaning. As such, it will appear to some to smack of verificationism, and some readers 
will be suspecting that the author is unaware the well-known shortcomings of verificationism. 
Though I am sympathetic to the view that many apparent questions are pseudo-questions, and 
hence to the spirit that drove attempts to distinguish sense from nonsense in terms of verifiability, 
I think that the attempts in the first half of the preceding century to draw a clean line of demarcation 
between sense and nonsense were too simplistic. But the absence of a simple and clean distinction 
between sense and nonsense does not mean that there is no difference, and does not mean that we 
are incapable of speaking nonsense no matter how hard we try. Nor does it free us of the obligation 
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to take care not to inadvertently fall into nonsense. On the contrary, it only sharpens the obligation 
to beware of nonsense, as there is no easy safeguard.  
The problem with verificationism is that the world is under no obligation to ensure that all 
physical distinctions be ones that can be empirically decided by beings like us. There may be 
genuine physical facts, that have their place in the physical scheme of things, which are beyond 
our reach.  
For an example, consider the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory. On this theory, ordinary 
physical objects are composed of corpuscles that travel on non-Newtonian trajectories. The 
dynamics of any theory of this sort, in order to be empirically adequate, require a distinguished 
relation of distant simultaneity. If we had access to the details of the trajectories of the Bohmian 
corpuscles, we could discern from them the distinguished relation of distant simultaneity, as the 
temporal order of two interventions performed at a distance from each other makes a difference to 
the trajectories. However, on a theory of this sort, as a matter of principle, the details of the 
trajectories are unavailable to us, as any attempt to monitor them disturbs them (and this is not an 
ad hoc postulate of the theory, but rather, a consequence of the theory’s dynamics). Since the 
dynamics require a distinguished relation of distant simultaneity, the proper spacetime of Bohmian 
mechanics is one that contains that structure, even if the observable phenomena are Lorentz 
invariant. This is an example of a theory with unobservable spacetime structure. 
The limitation on knowledge of some details of the physical world embedded in de Broglie-
Bohm pilot wave theory is unlike the positing of putative spacetime structure with no dynamical 
connection to anything observable. Though individually imperceptible (usually), Bohmian 
corpuscles are not unconnected with experience, as, according to this theory, every object that we 
see is composed of such corpuscles. Nor are they causally inert (despite what is sometimes said); 
12 
 
on the most sensible way of construing causal relations on this theory, the particles do indeed act 
on one another.3 My considerations about how concepts get a grip on the world do not require all 
meaningful statements about Bohmian trajectories to be verifiable. Bohmian trajectories in a 
Bohmian world are not of the same cloth as putative dynamically inert spacetime structure. The 
latter is something that we are completely causally unconnected with, and nevertheless we are 
asked to imagine that we can refer to it.  
 
4. Neither substantivalist nor relationist 
If, as we should be, we are realist about dynamical laws, then spacetime structure, regarded 
in this way, as encoding certain properties of the dynamics, is real. As the laws don’t depend on 
what we think of them, spacetime structure does not depend on what we think of it, and, as there 
is a matter of fact about what the dynamical symmetries are, there is a matter of fact about what 
the spacetime structure is. Nor are these facts dependent on relations between material objects, as 
the relevant facts about the dynamical laws encode both possible and actual trajectories of material 
objects.4 
This is, therefore, realism about spacetime structure. But it is not substantivalism.5 
Spacetime is not a thing (it is a non-entity, as Brown and Pooley put it). Just as trajectories 
                                                 
3 A full defense of this claim would take us beyond the scope of this paper. 
4 It should be clear that I am not adopting a Humean conception of dynamical laws. 
5 Some will claim that “substantivalism” is merely the word in vogue for a broad class of realist conceptions of 
spacetime, with no connotation of spacetime being substantival. I am not convinced that it is possible to strip the word 
of that sort of connotation, and for that reason regard it as a poor terminological choice to stretch the scope of the term 
so far. But this is merely a terminological matter. The substantive point is that the view defend here is a realist view, 
but not one that takes spacetime to be a substance or anything like one. 
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permitted by dynamical laws are actual or potential trajectories of things or collections of things, 
spacetime relations are actual or potential relations between things. 
  
It is not relationism, either. Spacetime structure is not to be construed in terms as actual 
relations between material things, as a typical relationist view would have it. 
The idea that there are basically two positions in the philosophy of spacetime, the 
substantivalist and the relationist, has never, in my view, been a useful tool for thinking about the 
role that spacetime concepts play either in our ordinary discourse or in our physical theorizing. It 
is time for it to be discarded. 
 
5. Carts, horses, and two-sided coins 
If we accept that the connection between spacetime structure and dynamical symmetries 
and asymmetries is analytic, then to say that the metric of spacetime is Minkowski, and to say that 
all dynamical laws are Lorentz invariant, is to say the same thing. It is true that moving rods 
contract because of the nature of the forces that keep them rigid (though not because of any details 
of the forces involved in this or that rod, but because of features that all forces share). But it would 
be incorrect to say that it is not because spacetime is Minkowski that moving rods contract, as to 
say that spacetime is Minkowski is not to say anything other than that all forces are Lorentz 
invariant. 
It must be acknowledged that, though there are passages in Physical Relativity that clearly 
suggest the view I have been defending, there are others in tension with it. On the one hand, we 
have passages such as the following, in harmony with the view defended here. 
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In special relativity, the Minkowskian metric is no more than the Kleinian geometry 
associated with the symmetry group of the quantum physics (p. 9). 
 
It is more natural in theories such as Newtonian mechanics or SR to consider the 4-
connection as a codification of certain key aspects of the behaviour of particles and 
fields (p. 142). 
 
On the other hand there are passages that suggest that spacetime structure and dynamical behaviour 
are distinct. 
 
A moving rod contracts, and a moving clock dilates, because of how it is made up 
and not because of the nature of its spatio-temporal environment” (p. 8). 
  
This echoes Brown and Pooley’s response to a claim of Balashov and Janssen (2003) about 
explanatory priority of spacetime structure over dynamics. Balashov and Janssen write, 
 
Does the Minkowskian nature of space-time explain why the forces holding a rod 
together are Lorentz invariant or the other way around? 
 
Our intuition is that the geometrical structure of space(-time) is the explanans here 
and the invariance of the forces the explanandum. To switch things around, our 
intuition tells us, is putting the cart before the horse (pp. 340–341). 
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In response, Brown and Pooley write, 
 
From our perspective, of course, the direction of explanation goes the other way 
around. It is the Lorentz covariance of the laws that underwrites the fact that the 
geometry of spacetime is Minkowskian (2006, p. 84). 
 
 There’s something awry here. If talk of spacetime structure codifies facts about dynamical 
symmetries, there can be no question of explanatory priority of one over the other. Every moving 
rod indeed contracts because of the nature of the forces that hold it rigid, but it is not correct to say 
that it is not because of the spacetime environment that rods contract, if attributes of that spacetime 
environment are codifications of symmetries shared by all forces that could be responsible for the 
behaviour of moving rods. This is a point that has been lucidly been made by Pablo Acuña . Since, 
as he puts it, “Minkowski structure and Lorentz invariance are like the two sides of a single coin 
(2016, p. 11), “rather than a unidirectional explanatory arrow, what connects Lorentz invariance 
and Minkowski spacetime structure is a bidirectional explicatory arrow” (p. 12). I think we should 
take passages in Physical Relativity that seem to suggest the distinctness of spacetime symmetries 
and dynamical symmetries as slips, symptomatic of the fact that the usual ways of talking about 
spacetime issues are hard to shake.  
 Though, from the dynamical perspective, there is no question of explanatory priority 
between spacetime structure and dynamics, there is an issue of ontological dependence on which 
the dynamical perspective is in disagreement with substantivalism. On a traditional sort of 
substantivalist view, spacetime structure can be self-subsistent, independent of any facts about the 
dynamics of material systems, and it is this independence that permits the substantivalist to 
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entertain the possibility of explanatory priority of spacetime over dynamics. On the dynamical 
view, there is no possibility of this sort of independence. 
 
6. Norton’s challenge 
 John Norton (2008) poses a challenge for views of this sort which Norton calls 
“constructive relativity.” Constructive relativity, according to Norton, requires that we recover the 
geometry of spacetime from a matter theory “devoid of spatiotemporal presumptions” (p. 825). 
This, Norton argues, is a tall order, and, indeed, one that cannot be fulfilled, as, in order for the 
project to get off the ground, our matter theory must presuppose some spacetime structure, the 
very structure to be derived. 
 Norton is right about the dim prospects of the constructive project that he envisages, 
namely, that of recovering spacetime structure from a matter theory formulated without any 
spatiotemporal presumptions. This is because the matter theory will have to include dynamical 
laws, that is, laws of motion, and it is simply nonsensical to talk of motion in the absence of 
spatiotemporal presumptions. If the view defended here requires the feasibility of a project of that 
sort, then, indeed, it is doomed, barring some as-yet-unconceived conceptual innovation that would 
permit one to formulate a dynamical theory with no spatiotemporal presuppositions. 
 But is the view indeed committed to the feasibility of such a project? Let us consider how 
we actually do apply spacetime concepts to arrive at dynamical laws, and then refine our 
conception of spacetime on the basis of those laws. 
 It is a dialectical process. To arrive at dynamical laws, we do experiments, and these 
involve measurements of lengths and duration that implicitly assume some spacetime structure. It 
does not follow that the spacetime structure we ultimately arrive at is precisely the one that is 
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presumed at the outset. We can start with Aristotelian presuppositions about spacetime and 
investigate, by means of experiments with balls rolling on smooth wooden planes, whether objects 
have an inherent tendency to come to rest. An inertial physics may be formulated with 
presuppositions that include a distinguished state of rest; it is possible then to realize, on the basis 
of that physics, that the supposed notion of rest in fact plays no role and has no significance. 
Electromagnetism may be formulated against a background of Galilean spacetime (presupposing 
a stationary aether that defines a background state of rest) and its properties investigated, leading 
to the realization that the theory involving only the fields and ponderable matter is invariant under 
Lorentz transformations and that the presumed aether rest frame is, contrary to first appearances, 
playing no role. And one route to general relativity involves formulating a field theory against a 
flat background that, in the final analysis, ends up having no dynamical significance.  
 
 These shifts involve stripping away superfluous structure. One formulates a theory against 
a presumed background that contains all the structure needed to formulate the theory, and more, 
and then realizes that some of the presumed structure is actually playing no role. One could, also, 
go the other way; a researcher with Newtonian presuppositions who found herself in an 
Aristotelian universe could discover that bodies do, in fact, tend to approach a preferred state of 
rest. 
 The shift from special relativity to general relativity is more complicated. General-
relativistic spacetimes tend to have lots of local inhomogeneities not present in the background 
spacetime of special relativity, so it’s not, like the other shifts, merely a matter of stripping away 
posited asymmetries. But the shift from special relativity did involve a conceptual analysis that led 
to the conclusion that the presumed absolute distinction between inertial and accelerated motion 
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in fact plays no role; in its place is a physically meaningful distinction between free fall motion 
and motion that, under the influence of non-gravitational forces, deviates from a free fall trajectory. 
Here, again, the key move was conceptual analysis that revealed that a distinction that had seemed 
necessary to formulate laws of motion was actually failing to play a role in the dynamics, and 
hence failing to get a grip on anything in reality. 
 
7. Theories with a dynamical spacetime structure 
 Earman’s principles SP1 and SP2 are formulated in the context of theories with non-
dynamical spacetime structure, spacetime structure that is “absolute,” in Anderson’s terminology 
(Anderson, 1967). Theories, such as general relativity, in which some of the spacetime structure 
is itself dynamical, complicate things a bit, as they require us, when talking of dynamical 
symmetries, to specify which dynamics we are talking about; the full dynamics of the theory, 
including the dynamical spacetime structure, or the dynamics of test particles in the setting of that 
spacetime structure? 
Consider GR. The dynamics of the theory are given by the Einstein Field Equations, 
supplemented by dynamics for whatever forms of matter there might be. If these are such that the 
equations of motions for any material systems that could be used as measuring devices for 
durations or distances satisfy what has been called the “comma-goes-to-semicolon” rule—which 
roughly can be characterized as formulating them as if they were special relativistic equations and 
then replacing the Minkowski metric  with the dynamical tensor field g , and replacing 
derivatives by covariant derivatives—then those systems will behave as measurers of the 
dynamical tensor field g, thereby endowing that tensor field with chronogeometric significance. 
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As Brown rightly emphasizes, it is only because material rods and clocks couple in this way to g 
that we can regard it as having anything to do with a spacetime metric. 
 How might we apply Earman’s principles to this theory, or any theory having similar 
properties? The dynamical equations require no background spacetime structure besides the 
topological and differential structure of the manifold. This is the sort of thing that is meant when 
it is said that general relativity realizes a wider class of spacetime symmetries than special relativity 
does, namely, the group of diffeomorphisms of the manifold.6 There is a sense in which arbitrary 
diffeomorphisms represent both symmetries of the background spacetime, and dynamical 
symmetries. 
 On the other hand, one can also consider the dynamics of test particles, and of rods and 
clocks, with sufficiently small mass-energy that they have negligible effect on the metric tensor 
field, for whom the metric tensor field plays the role of a background against which their motions 
play out. Any model of general relativity gives us a spacetime with its own affine structure and 
metric. This spacetime structure will have its own symmetries and asymmetries. Since, at each 
point, there are coordinates in which the metric takes the form of the Minkowski metric, there will 
be local symmetries (which, for each point, hold approximately in a sufficiently small 
neighbourhood of that point), given by the Lorentz group. These symmetries typically cannot be 
extended globally, though, for particular solutions, there might be global symmetries, such as the 
rotational symmetries of the Schwarzschild solution. It is this structure that is spoken of when it is 
said that general relativity doesn’t obliterate all distinctions between motions, but merely replaces 
the inertial/accelerated distinction of special relativity with free-fall/not free-fall. 
                                                 
6 And, of course, there is a long history of confusion about this, stemming from Einstein’s thought that general 
covariance of the dynamical equations ensured this sort of background independence. See Norton (1993), Pooloey 
(2010). 
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 So, in applying Earman’s principles, we must ask: which dynamics, and which spacetime 
structure? The dynamical symmetries of the full theory are arbitrary diffeomorphisms, and the 
background spacetime of the theory is one that is invariant under arbitrary diffeomorphisms, a 
spacetime with no intrinsic structure other than its differential and topological structure. If, 
however, we consider the dynamics of test particles, then the dynamical symmetries are the 
symmetries of the metric tensor field, and that metric gives the spacetime structure of the dynamics 
of the test particles. 
 
8. Theories with multiple metrics 
 There is a path to general relativity that involves starting with a background Minkowski 
spacetime, and, as a linear approximation to the full theory to be developed, defining a gravitational 
tensor field h, that satisfies a relativistic wave equation with matter energy-momentum as 
source.7 The dynamical equations for matter are taken to couple, not to the background metric, but 
to a linear combination of that metric and the gravitational tensor field h, which we will denote 
g. If the kinetic energy of free particles couples to g, their trajectories will be geodesics of g, 
and, if the forces governing the internal workings of material systems also couple to g, then 
physical clocks and rods will measure its distances and times, not distances and times according 
to the flat background metric. One obtains the full, nonlinear theory via an iterative process that 
involves including the energy-momentum of the linearized gravitational field as a source, resulting 
in nonlinear equations, which entail corrections to the field; the energy-momentum of this yields 
further corrections to the source term, and so on. The iterative process yields, finally, a fully 
                                                 
7 See Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973), 424–425,  435–437, and Ohanian and Ruffini (1976) Ch. 3 for textbook 
expositions. For a more thorough treatment see Deser (1970, 2010). Deser (1987) generalizes the treatment to a curved 
background, driving home the irrelevance of the metric of the initial background spacetime. 
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consistent theory that is equivalent to GR. Though the process starts with field equations written 
on a flat background, this background drops out from the final, generally covariant field equations, 
and in the end has no physical significance, as it is neither measured by physical rods and clocks 
nor essential for the formulation of the full theory’s field equations. One might be tempted to 
weave a skeptical scenario from this, saying that perhaps, spacetime is really Minkowski but our 
rods and clocks are distorted in such a way that obscures this fact. This attempt at generating a 
skeptical scenario does not succeed. The metric structure measured by rods and clocks is a genuine 
attribute of the dynamical laws, and is in no sense an illusion, as it is every bit as real as are the 
dynamical laws. And, if the supposed flat background plays no dynamical role whatsoever, there 
can be no sense in which it is the “true” structure of spacetime. 
For different sorts of field equations, it can happen that the flat background retains some 
physical significance, and hence is not disposable in the way that the flat background is at the end 
of the path to GR that starts with a linearized theory.8 On a theory of this sort, there will be a 
mismatch between the dynamical symmetries of the field equations (or of the Lagrangian from 
which they are derived) and the symmetries of the spacetime structure relevant to the dynamics of 
material objects. The former are given by the Poincaré group, the latter, the symmetries of the 
metric field. 
This gives rise to a worry. Since, on a theory of this sort, there is a mismatch between the 
dynamical symmetries of the field equations and those of the spacetime metric measured by rods 
and clocks, then, on such a theory, one or both of Earman’s principles is false. Even if we don’t 
believe that the actual physics of our world contains a mismatch of this sort, if there are 
conceptually coherent physical theories, indeed, ones that were actually proposed as candidate 
                                                 
8 See Pitts (2016), and his contribution to this issue, for discussions of theories of this sort, and references to the 
literature. 
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theories of gravitation, on which Earman’s principles are false, this shows that they are not 
analytic.9 
The thing to say about these theories is, I think, similar to what was said in the previous 
section about GR. There, also, there is a mismatch between the metric structure presupposed by 
the field equations (none) and the emergent metric measured by rods and clocks. When asking 
whether a dynamical symmetry is a spacetime symmetry, we need to ask, “Which dynamics?” and 
“Which spacetime structure?” There is a dynamics governing the full theory, including the metric 
field, and there will be a corresponding spacetime structure that is the spacetime of that dynamics, 
whose symmetries match the dynamical symmetries. Given a solution of the field equations, there 
are dynamics of test particles and small rods and clocks, with spacetime structure yielded by the 
metric field tensor of that solution. Both connections between dynamical symmetries and 
spacetime symmetries are analytic. To say that, for test bodies, there is a real distinction between 
motion along geodesics of the metric and motion that is forced away from geodesics, is to 
simultaneously refer to a fact about the dynamics of these bodies and their spacetime environment. 
To say that the field equations do (or do not) require a flat background spacetime is to 
simultaneously refer to a fact about these field equations and their spacetime setting. 
It is a strength of the dynamical perspective, emphasized by Pitts (this issue), that it does 
not require there to be a single true metric of spacetime. Since spacetime structure is picked out by 
its dynamical role, if two (or more) different metrics fulfill different dynamical roles, then each 
can be regarded as a legitimate spacetime metric. 
 
9. Conclusion 
                                                 
9 I am grateful to Simon Saunders and Brian Pitts for raising this point in correspondence. 
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 As I have said, one finds in Physical Relativity a view about the nature of spacetime that 
goes beyond the familiar dichotomy of substantivalism and relationism. Moreover, I have argued, 
investigation of the role that spacetime concepts play in physical theorizing shows that it is the 
only view possible, as the connection between spacetime structure and dynamical symmetries is a 
conceptual one, rendering propositions such as Earman’s guiding principles analytic. 
When the views entertained in Brown’s volume, or similar views, are generally admitted, 
we can foresee a considerable revolution in the literature on the philosophy of spacetime. We will 
see an end to the continuing variations on the struggle between substantivalist and relationist 
theories of spacetime. This does not, however, leave the philosopher of spacetime with nothing 
left to do. Though, I claim, talk of supposed spacetime structure that plays no dynamical role makes 
no sense, it does not follow from this that it is a straightforward matter to determine what (in 
Stein’s words) the true structure of the spacetime of a given dynamical theory is. Precisely because 
of the dialectical process discussed in the section 6, above, a dynamical theory, as originally 
formulated, might not wear its symmetries on its sleeve, and there may be considerable work to be 
done in elucidating the true spacetime of a given dynamical theory. 
The history of changing conceptions of spacetime has shown us that understanding which 
distinctions are and are not physically meaningful may require deep conceptual analysis. This is 
exhibited in Einstein’s critique of the notion of simultaneity, and in his “happiest thought,” and 
also in current investigations, already mentioned, into the conceptual structure of Newtonian 
theory and its true spacetime structure. There is also the issue of what sense, if any, can be made 
of the idea, suggested by some of the literature on quantum gravity, of a theory formulated in a 
way that is entirely independent of a background spacetime, with all spacetime structure emergent. 
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There remains plenty for a philosopher of spacetime to do once the old dichotomy of 
substantivalism and relationism has been set aside. 
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